Geopolitical developments in South East Europe: the political-geographical rearrangement of South East Europe by Jordan, Peter
www.ssoar.info
Geopolitical developments in South East Europe:
the political-geographical rearrangement of South
East Europe
Jordan, Peter
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Jordan, P. (2007). Geopolitical developments in South East Europe: the political-geographical rearrangement of South
East Europe. Europa Regional, 15.2007(2), 87-98. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-48104-8
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
87
Zusammenfassung
Geopolitische Entwicklungen in Südosteuropa
Die politisch-geographische Neuordnung Südosteuropas
Der Beitrag widmet sich den wesentlichen Schritten der politisch-geographischen Neuordnung in Südosteuropa nach der politischen Wende 
des Jahres 1989. Dabei werden unter Südosteuropa im kulturräumlichen Sinn die byzantinisch geprägten und osmanisch nachhaltig über-
prägten Gebiete südlich von Donau und Save einschließlich Bosniens und der Herzegowina verstanden. Die Überlegungen beziehen aber auch 
Slowenien und Kroatien als Nachfolgestaaten Jugoslawiens sowie Rumänien mit ein. Als Ausgangspunkte pfadabhängiger Transformations-
prozesse werden die Spielarten des Kommunismus in dieser Region eingehend diskutiert. Das Wiederaufleben der nationalen Frage schon in 
der Endphase des Kommunismus war entscheidend für den Zerfall Jugoslawiens, aber auch für die Entwicklung der politischen und gesell-
schaftlichen Situation in den anderen Staaten. Die internationale Staatengemeinschaft reagierte auf die gewaltsamen Konflikte beim Zerfall 
Jugoslawiens mit einer Eindämmungsstrategie, die sich auch in einem Heranführen Südosteuropas an die europäischen Strukturen äußerte. 
Immer noch bestehen aber mit dem Kosovo, Makedonien und Bosnien-Herzegowina akute und latente Konfliktherde. Nationale Antagonismen 
erschweren es Südosteuropa, seiner Stellung als europäische Peripherie zu entkommen und an Eigengewicht zu gewinnen. Seine traditionelle 
Brückenfunktion zwischen Europa und Vorderasien nimmt es aber wieder ein, wozu seine altansässigen muslimischen Bevölkerungsgruppen 
einen wichtigen Beitrag leisten.
Südosteuropa, Geopolitik, Kommunismus, Nationalismus, Transformation, EU-Erweiterung, Muslime
Abstract
This article is dedicated to the essential phases in the political/geographic restructuring of South East Europe after the political changes in 1989. 
South East Europe is understood in terms of cultural regions such as those sustainably formed by the Byzantine and Ottoman cultures south 
of the Danube and Save Rivers including Bosnia and Hercegovina. Our deliberations will also include Slovenia and Croatia as the follow-up 
states of Yugoslavia and Romania. The different types of communism in this region will be discussed in detail as the point of departure of 
path-dependent transformation processes. The resurgence of the national issue in the final phases of communism was the key factor for the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia, but also for the emergence of the political and social situation in the other states. The international community 
of states reacted to the violent conflicts during the disintegration of Yugoslavia with a containment strategy that expressed itself by bringing 
South East Europe closer to European structures. However, there are still acute and latent flashpoints in the form of Kosovo, Macedonia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. National antagonisms make it difficult for South East Europe to escape its position as the European periphery and to 
gain its own stature. However, it is beginning to regain its traditional function as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East to which its old 
Muslim population groups make an important contribution.
South East Europe, geopolitics, communism, nationalism, transformation, extension of the European Union, Muslims
Geopolitical developments in South East Europe
The political-geographical rearrangement of South East Europe
Peter Jordan
Introduction
This article shall illuminate important 
geopolitical developments and changes 
in South East Europe since 1989, because 
they are of great importance for the Med-
iterranean region. Some of South East 
Europe can even be considered part of the 
Mediterranean region; in any case, it is 
bound by common historical influences 
(particularly the Roman Empire, Eastern 
Rome, Byzantium, Ottoman Empire), as 
well as traditional and current economic 
and migration relationships. Since the 
political changes of 1989, it has proven 
to be both the most dangerous European 
crisis region, and also one of the main 
sources of refugee and migration flows. 
Mediterranean countries like Italy and 
Greece have been substantially affected 
by it. Parts of the Mediterranean region 
also connect South East Europe with old, 
established Muslim population groups – 
vestiges of the Ottoman Empire.
In a cultural-geographical sense, 
South East Europe can be understood as 
consisting of those European countries, 
which in addition to the cultural influ-
ences of Byzantium, have also been sig-
nificantly reshaped by the Ottoman Em-
pire (as consequence of its particularly 
protracted and direct rule there). This 
characterization is certainly true for the 
region south of the Danube and Sava, 
including Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
other successor states of Yugoslavia 
(Slovenia and Croatia), as well as Roma-
nia are included in this article because 
they are closely connected to the devel-
opments mentioned.
The impetus for the political-geo-
graphical realignment of South East Eu-
rope was the collapse of communism. 
The contrast between the self-governing 
system of Yugoslavia and the planned 
economies of the other communist states 
meant that the collapse manifested itself 
in different ways than in the rest of com-
munist Europe. The individual states of 
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South East Europe also stood in very 
different relations to the community of 
communist states and played different 
roles on the international political stage. 
It is important to note these differences 
in order to understand the difference in 
the transformation processes that fol-
lowed.
The resurgence of the national ques-
tion, which had already begun in the 
final phase of communism, is of crucial 
importance not only in the collapse of 
Yugoslavia. Then, as now, it sets the po-
litical and social climate to a great extent 
also in the other countries in the region 
and therefore deserves appropriate atten-
tion.
Serbia’s attempt to retain dominance 
over the greater part of the former Yugo-
slavia is identified as one of the factors 
triggered the violent conflicts in former 
Yugoslavia. The international communi-
ty reacted to this conflict with a strategy 
of confinement which changed the politi-
cal landscape of South East Europe con-
siderably and initiated the integration of 
this large region into the European struc-
tures. Both of these results are objects of 
a detailed analysis.
Finally, remaining hurdles in the 
conflict are discussed and an attempt is 
made to assess future roles of South East 
Europe in Europe as a whole, with a par-
ticular focus on the position of Muslim 
groups in South East Europe.
Geopolitical changes since 1989
The collapse of communism 
With the exception of Greece and Cy-
prus, communist parties seized power 
after the Second World War in all of the 
states of South East Europe. They came 
into power in different ways, not all could 
rely on mass support. They practised dif-
ferent political and economic systems, 
and were incorporated in different ways 
into the communist world. The former 
communist states thus offered different 
jumping-off points for political and eco-
nomic transformation after the collapse 
of communism.
In Yugoslavia and Albania, the com-
munist movement had a broad basis in 
Tito’s and Enver Hoxha’s partisan move-
ments, in contrast to the rest of commu-
nist South East Europe. Both partisan 
movements had developed during the 
resistance against German and Italian 
occupying forces. They were thus lib-
eration movements that were rooted in 
broad sections of the population, if not 
unrivalled, and were supported by the 
western allies. Liberation and commu-
nist seizure of power occurred different-
ly than in most other communist states 
without considerable support from the 
Soviet Union and its Red Army which af-
forded them a great deal of political lee-
way with respect to Moscow and greater 
self-assuredness in their own activities.
While Tito’s and Hoxha’s partisan 
movements initially cooperated and even 
discussed joining Albania to Yugoslavia, 
a rift occurred between Tito and Hoxha 
following Tito’s break with Stalin and 
the withdrawal of communist Yugosla-
via from the Communist Information 
Bureau (1948); Hoxha remained true to 
Moscow and continued on a Stalinist 
course. Tito’s Yugoslavia in contrast did 
not become a member of the Warsaw Pact 
of 1955, but became co-founder of the 
Non-Aligned Movement in 1961, and at 
the same time with its “self-management 
socialism” struck out on its own socialist 
path, which soon would differentiate it 
from all other communist states.
Communist Yugoslavia had no cen-
trally controlled planned economy, but 
rather had a self-management system 
that regulated business and the “public 
sector” [društveni sektor]. Self-manag-
ing companies acted autonomously, set 
their own business goals and procedures, 
were not in state ownership but, formally 
at least, were employee owned. Along 
with the “public sector” there was a pri-
vate sector of the economy, however it 
was legally limited and primarily served 
a supplementary function. Private farm-
ers could own up to 10 ha land. Because 
the collectivisation of agriculture had 
been discontinued in the late 1940s, 
they farmed nearly 70 % of all agricul-
tural land until the late 1980s (Taschler 
1989). Private service sector businesses 
were permitted to operate, but without 
hired service personnel (as family busi-
nesses), but played a significant role – in 
coastal tourism for instance.
This dual system gave Yugoslavia 
a veneer of “human socialism”. In con-
trast to the planned economies, sufficient 
consumer goods were available, there 
was freedom to travel, itinerant workers 
were permitted to seek employment in 
the West (after 1963), and there was un-
hindered tourism allowed from Western 
countries. Still, the communist party (of-
ficially, the Communist League) still ex-
ercised political control in Yugoslavia – 
personified to a great degree in the char-
ismatic leader Tito – over the economy 
through a politically-controlled system 
of loan issuance, and over political views 
through reprimand and prosecution.
In contrast, the other communist 
states of South East Europe had actual 
planned economies with centrally de-
signed business plans that set production 
goals, allocated roles and set objectives 
for individual sectors and regions. Agri-
culture was collective with the exception 
of mountain areas and small personal 
farms and organized into large govern-
ment operations, or into collective farms 
(depending on the country). All services 
(financial, trade, traffic, tourism) were 
operated by the state or associations. 
They were neglected (in stark contrast to 
Yugoslavia), which caused undersupply. 
Also in contrast to Yugoslavia, the other 
communist states diverted shipping of 
commercial goods to the railway. Road 
traffic was in every respect something of 
an anomaly, which meant that the road 
network was significantly less developed 
than in Yugoslavia.
Economic transformation in Yugosla-
via therefore started with a much differ-
ent set of conditions than other commu-
nist states: predominantly non-collective, 
small farm based private agriculture, 
making privatization of agriculture with 
all the associated upheaval almost unnec-
essary; a relatively well-developed retail 
trade system; tourism infrastructure that 
was nearly suited to the market; and a 
road network that was well-developed 
even in rural areas.
We should not overlook that the rela-
tively liberal system and higher standard 
of living likely imparted Yugoslavian cit-
izens with a certain feeling of superior-
ity over their communist neighbors. This 
has had a lasting effect to this day, such 
that Albanians in Kosovo and Macedo-
nia, for instance, hardly give a thought to 
uniting with Albania.
In the political-administrative arena, 
the Yugoslavian principle of self-man-
aged socialism led, in contrast to the oth-
er centrally organized communist states 
of South East Europe, to the development 
of a federal system with six constituent 
republics and two autonomous provinces 
(within the constituent republic of Ser-
bia) which were defined along national/
ethnic lines and on the local level were 
set up in self-governing communes. The 
1974 constitution strengthened political-
administrative self-government and gave 
the republics and autonomous provinces 
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the status of significant political actors 
alongside the federal administration. 
Their political clout increased following 
the death of President Tito in 1980 and 
representatives of the republics and au-
tonomous provinces occupied the Cen-
tral Committee with a chairmanship that 
rotated annually.
The great independence and power of 
the republics and autonomous provinc-
es, in any case since 1974 (roggemann 
1980), not only helped develop their own 
political and administrative structures, 
but also helped develop such structures 
in all other areas. The individual repub-
lics also developed their own raw mate-
rials industries, energy supply systems 
and harbor locations. The development 
of quasi sovereign state structures also 
applied to republics and autonomous 
provinces which, like Slovenia, Macedo-
nia, and Kosovo had not been political 
units prior to communist Yugoslavia; or 
like Croatia, which had previously ex-
isted within other borders. In the case of 
these states at least, state independence 
would hardly have been possible without 
the federal Yugoslav phase.
The resurgence of the national que-
stion
As an internationalist ideology, com-
munism attached only secondary signifi-
cance to the national question. But it was 
the communist states of South East Eu-
rope which developed forms of commu-
nism with nationalist undertones in the 
sense of communist national states fol-
lowing the Stalin period. This was par-
ticularly evident under Nicolai Ceauşescu 
in Romania beginning in the late 1960s, 
and to a lesser extent also in Bulgaria and 
Albania. The victims of these forms of 
communism, which saw the state at the 
possession of the state nation, were the 
Hungarian minority in Romania; in Bul-
garia, the Turks who were pressured up 
until the final phase of communist domi-
nance (1984/85) and tried to emigrate in 
large numbers to Turkey. The relatively 
large group of Greeks in Albania formed 
the main national opponents of an Alba-
nian nationalist communism.
 Yugoslavia, which was de facto a 
multinational state, but which in the in-
terwar period understood itself also as 
nation state – namely, of the Yugoslavian 
nation consisting of the Serbian, Croat 
and Slovene peoples – also went its own 
way in this regard. In a conscious break 
with the Yugoslavia of the interwar peri-
od which was under the hegemony of the 
Serbs, Tito’s Yugoslavia sought a balance 
between the southern Slavic nations. The 
non-Slavic Albanians however, were not 
accorded an equal role.
Achieving this balance involved more 
than just establishing a federal system. 
Under the pressure of Tito’s partisan 
movement which had also achieved vic-
tory over the Serbian nationalist Chet-
niks, the Serbs were stripped of their 
territorial claims (see Fig. 1): (1) Regions 
referred to in Serbia as southern Serbia 
were upgraded to the Republic of Mac-
edonia, its majority population was pro-
vided with all the trappings of a separate 
Orthodox nation (standard language, 
autocephalous Orthodox church); (2) 
Serbia was prevented from direct inter-
ference with sections of Serbia that con-
tained large national/ethnic minorities 
(Kosovo, Vojvodina) because they were 
autonomous; (3) Bosnia-Hercegovina, 
whose population up to the 1961 census 
was predominantly Serbian (The miro-
slav Krleža lexicographical insTiTuTe 
1993, p. 123), was granted the status of 
a republic with no special rights for the 
Serbs; (4) Montenegro, which had been 
an independent state prior to the forma-
tion of Yugoslavia, but which had inte-
grated itself without reservation into Yu-
goslavia and whose majority understood 
itself nationally as Serbs, was also estab-
lished as an independent republic with 
“Montenegrins” as the titular nation; (5) 
12 compact communes in Croatia bor-
dering each other with Serbian majori-
ties received no special status.
All these measures were tolerated by 
the Serbs. Flare-ups of Serbian nation-
alism (such as occurred in the first half 
of the 1960s when the Serb Aleksander 
Ranković was the General Secretary of 
the Communist League) were suppressed 
under Tito’s authority. Nationalist dem-
onstrations by Croats and Slovenes, 
which were grounded in the feeling that 
they were disadvantaged within Yugo-
slavia’s disparity equalization system, 
for which they as the most economically 
capable always ended up footing the bill, 
were likewise held back by Tito. 
What was lacking to go along with the 
suppression of national claims and na-
tionalist upsurges through the power of 
the communist dictatorship and despite 
relatively favorable economic conditions, 
was grappling with the history of the se-
vere conflicts between the Yugoslavian 
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Fig. 1: Regions which Serbia could see as “Serbian” after the Second World War
Source: own design
90 Europa Regional 15(2007)2
nations (and also with Albanians), es-
pecially during the Second World War. 
They had caused severe mutual injury 
and continued to fester on as unresolved 
potential conflicts.
Once the economic situation began to 
deteriorate in 1980 (bottlenecks with fuel 
and consumer goods supply at the begin-
ning of the 1980s), following the death 
of the unanimously popular Tito, the na-
tional consciousness of all of these resur-
faced. This is also reflected statistically 
in the decrease in numbers of those who 
thought of themselves as supranational, 
in a purely civic sense as “Yugoslavi-
ans” – that is, who no longer considered 
their national/ethnic affiliation essential. 
Between the all-Yugoslav census of 1981 
and that of 1991, this group dropped from 
5.4 % to 3.0 % of the population (savezni 
zavod za sTaTisTiKu 1981; savezni zavod 
za sTaTisTiKu 1993).
The resurgence of a national con-
sciousness meant for Serbs that they 
strengthened their claim to primacy in 
the whole state and intended to restrict 
the far-reaching self-government of the 
autonomous Serbian provinces, espe-
cially Kosovo. Early in the 1980s, the 
idea of Greater Serbia was reawakened 
in the background, which considered 
all of the Orthodox southern Slavs ex-
cept for Bulgarians, and all those who 
spoke the Štokavian dialect to be Serbs, 
and which held the belief, along the 
lines of the 1844 published “schemes” 
of Načertanje, that the Serbian people 
would only be capable of successful na-
tional development once they succeeded 
in dominating the rest of the southern 
Slavs. An important representative of 
the Greater Serbia idea was the Serbian 
geographer Jovan Cvijić (1865-1927), 
to whom the Serbian nationalists often 
made reference.
Among Croats and Slovenes the re-
surgence of a national consciousness 
strengthened the conviction that they 
did not have to share the fruits of their 
economic achievements with others. 
They also strove to live out their national 
cultures even more in their respective re-
publics.
As the majority in Bosnia-Herce-
govina, the Bosniaks (at the time called 
“ethnic Muslims”) strove for political 
dominance in this republic. The Kosovar 
Albanians demanded the status of a re-
public in Kosovo. The ethnic Macedoni-
ans increasingly viewed its minority-rich 
republic as its own nation state. Only 
Montenegro continued to cooperate 
closely with Serbia.
With these divergent aims, so at odds 
with one another, the resurgence of the 
national question became the driving 
force behind the collapse of Yugoslavia.
Nationalism and nationalist thinking 
culminated during the wars following 
Yugoslavia’s collapse, but are still com-
mon in the whole of South East Europe 
today and more deeply rooted than in 
many other parts of Europe. It is asso-
ciated with the “youth” of these nations, 
who first sought to free themselves from 
the dominance of the superpowers and 
then to emancipate themselves from na-
tionally different elites. It is associated 
with the Orthodox churches who, unlike 
the universal Roman Catholic Church, 
understand themselves to be national 
churches and after the fall of commu-
nism regained influence in society. It is 
also very much associated with the in-
version of the political position between 
these nations, who as Muslim converts 
backed the authority of the Ottoman 
Empire, and those other nations, who as 
Christians were discriminated against at 
that time and later represented the state 
nations. The latter accuse the former of 
betraying the common cause out of op-
portunism – an accusation that weighs 
heavily considering the keen historical 
consciousness in South East Europe. 
This, in fact, was the backdrop to some 
extent of all the virulent conflicts in the 
region today between Serbs and Albani-
ans, Bosniaks and Serbs/Croats, Mac-
edonians and Albanians.
The strong national consciousness, 
based on very different historical views 
and often antagonistic, makes the rela-
tionships between neighboring coun-
tries, as well as political and economic 
cooperation in the region difficult. Most 
of these states have oriented themselves, 
if at all, to an external reference point 
(Brussels, USA) rather than trying to 
seek an intra-regional relationship. That 
makes it more difficult for South East 
Europe to overcome the status of the Eu-
ropean periphery and to gain influence.
The collapse of Yugoslavia
While the collapse of Yugoslavia may 
well have been triggered by the resur-
gence of national consciousness with all 
of the peoples involved, and especially 
by the reemergence of the idea of Greater 
Serbia, and was only made possible by 
the end of the political rift in Europe, it 
had underlying causes that ran deeper, 
and were just waiting to be set off.
By far the most important was the 
cultural rift within the country. Cen-
tral European and Venetian-influenced 
Slovenes and Croats were juxtaposed 
against Byzantine and Ottoman- influ-
enced Serbs, Bosniaks, Macedonians, 
and Albanians (Montenegrins belonged 
to both categories). Competition orient-
ed, urbanized, enlightened, to some ex-
tent early industrialized societies came 
up against cultures for whom close ties 
between church and state/nation, rigid 
hierarchies and centralism were the rule 
and which persisted for a very long time 
in a feudal agrarian state.
Consequentially, a second important 
reason for collapse can be attributed to 
a steep northwest-southeast rift in the 
average educational level, in economic 
performance, and in the standard of liv-
ing within Yugoslavia (see BerTić 1987; 
malaschofsKy & Klein 1972). Despite 
intensive inter-Yugoslavian efforts to 
equalize the disparity it could not be 
reduced, but only continued to grow 
(Kiefer 1979). Due to this, the number of 
inter-Yugoslavian immigrants increased 
in the relatively well to do republics of 
Slovenia and Croatia in the 1980s. These 
republics viewed the growing number of 
immigrants as a burden and quickly tired 
of bankrolling the failed immigrants.
As a third reason it should be pointed 
out that even the Yugoslavia of the in-
terwar period could scarcely have come 
about in the form it did without exter-
nal pressure, and that Slovenia, Croatia 
and Serbia followed different state goals 
from the beginning. Also, communist 
Yugoslavia emerged in a macro-political 
situation that would not have allowed 
another alternative. It was not until this 
situation changed that collapse was pos-
sible.
A fourth reason was the highly so-
phisticated and far reaching (since 1974 
at least) political self-administration. It 
allowed for largely autonomous politi-
cal units, for whom independence was a 
small step.
The collapse of Yugoslavia (so far1) 
took place exactly along the inter-Yugo-
slavian borders, although some of these 
are very recent and many are derived 
from the post WWII period. They are also 
1  Further collapse, e.g. as a result of divisions of Bosnia 
and Hercegovina or of Kosovo or Macedonia, cannot 
be ruled out.
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undisputed with a few exceptions (the sea 
border between Slovenia and Croatia in 
the bay of Piran [Piranski zaliv/Piran-
ski zaljev], the Serbian majority com-
munes Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrivicë 
and Leposavić/Leposaviq on the border 
of Serbia and Kosovo, Albanian majority 
communes Medveđa, Bujanovac, Preševo 
on the border of Serbia and Kosovo).
The collapse of the relatively large 
Yugoslavia (1991: 256,000 km2, 23 mil-
lion inhabitants) into several small and 
medium-sized states has fundamentally 
changed the geopolitical situation in the 
Adriatic region. The power of Italy on the 
western Adriatic coast now has no near 
equivalent on the eastern coast and thus 
has become the dominant in the Adriatic 
region politically and economically.
The Adriatic is also no longer a border 
between political and economic systems 
or military blocks.
With time, this could lead to a reemer-
gence of the former Adriatic cultural unit 
as it existed from Roman times until the 
Second World War.
Serbia’s attempt to maintain domi-
nance over large parts of the former 
Yugoslavia
Against the backdrop of a resurgence of 
the idea Greater Serbia, expressed in a 
memorandum of the Serbian Academy of 
Sciences in 19842, the political represent-
atives of Serbia gave clear signals begin-
ning in the late 1980s that they wanted to 
solve the problem of Yugoslavia through 
tightened leadership in Belgrade and 
in favor of Serbia. In a speech in 1987 
Slobodan Milošević, chairman of the 
Serbian communists, sided with Serbs 
in Kosovo, who in his view were being 
persecuted. During commemoration of 
the slaughter of Kosovo polje in 1989, 
Milošević announced plans for energetic 
action against Albanians in Kosovo. In 
1990, Serbia suspended the autonomous 
rights of both of its autonomous prov-
inces Kosovo and Vojvodina so that the 
Yugoslavian state committee, in which 
the six representatives of the republics 
and the two representatives of the au-
tonomous provinces had the same voting 
rights, could no longer vote against Ser-
bian interests.3
2 see Milosavlejevíć 1998.
3 The representatives of Serbia and Montenegro, and 
now also those of Vojvodina and Kosovo, always voted 
in the interest of the Serbs.
This triggered ambitions for independ-
ence in Slovenia and Croatia. But the 
looming collapse of Yugoslavia was 
judged quite differently by the inter-
national community. Thus, there were 
forces within the European Community 
(later the European Union) which gave 
Belgrade assurances that they would ab-
solutely support the unity of Yugoslavia.
The federal army, which had been 
instrumentalized for Serbian interests, 
was first active in the June 1991 “Ten 
Day War” in order to prevent Slovenia 
breaking away. This attempted interven-
tion was half-hearted and failed quickly. 
With substantially greater pressure, the 
federal army was engaged in 1992 in 
Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina in or-
der to keep the large Serbian minority 
there in a common state. Belgrade also 
supported these minorities directly and 
encouraged them to form separate states. 
That led to violent conflicts that involved 
great loss of life in both republics, and 
did not end until August 2005 in Croatia 
with the dissolution of the Serbian 
separatist state and the mass exodus of 
a majority of the Serbs as well as until 
December 2005 in Bosnia-Hercegovina 
through US military intervention and the 
Dayton Agreement.
Serbia removed the Albanians from 
all administrative functions in Kosovo, 
whose autonomy rights had been sus-
pended in 1990. The Albanians then 
set up a shadow state, initially behav-
ing mostly peacefully until the conflicts 
in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina had 
ended in hopes of gaining international 
support. Since the support was not forth-
coming, even after 1995, they formed 
radical groups and militant fractions 
among themselves, which caused corre-
sponding Serbian reactions. The violent 
conflicts escalated and reached a peak 
in 1999 in the expulsion of hundreds of 
thousands of Albanians, especially into 
the neighboring countries of Albania 
and Macedonia but also into Montene-
gro, which since 1998 had ceased sup-
porting the Serbian course and gladly 
accepted the Albanian refugees. Due to 
this human catastrophe and also because 
of the threat of destabilization spread-
ing to other regions, NATO launched 
air strikes on Serbian cities, forcing the 
Serbs to relent.
With the removal of Milošević as the 
leader of Serbia in 2000, Serbia’s attempt 
to retain dominance over greater parts of 
the former Yugoslavia came to an end.
These attempts and their failure had far-
reaching consequences especially for the 
Serbs themselves, but also for the whole 
region. The former Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (it still consisted of Serbia 
and Montenegro) was placed under an 
economic blockade by the United Na-
tions from 1992 to 1995. That damaged 
the Serbian economy and prevented the 
beginning of a transformation process. 
The transportation blockade of Yugosla-
via diverted the West and Central Europe 
- South East Europe/Middle East route to 
the east, (through Romania and Bulgaria) 
and via shipping (between the ports on 
the northern Italian Adriatic and Greece) 
(Jordan 2006). Because of the interna-
tional discrediting of Milošević’s regime, 
the lack of security which lasted at least 
until the Kosovo ethnic cleansing crisis, 
and the instability of the internal politi-
cal situation, the transformation process 
could scarcely take hold between 1995 
and 2000 and Serbia was set back ten 
years. The diverted international trans-
portation as a result of the crisis years 
returned only partially to the Serbian 
routes after 2000.
Many of these consequences also af-
fected other countries in the region, albe-
it to a lesser extent. Macedonia was par-
ticularly affected and suffered nearly as 
severely as Serbia under the United Na-
tions economic and transportation block-
ade. Montenegro was also particularly 
affected as a republic of the Yugoslavian 
Federation which existed until 2003 and 
afterwards was converted to a loose un-
ion. This co-suffering was one of the es-
sential reasons for the distancing of Mon-
tenegro from Serbia beginning in 1998 
under the leadership of Milo Ðukanović. 
Its main industry, tourism, lay dormant 
a decade long and only started to revive 
in the early 2000s. Even Croatian tour-
ism was hit hard and did not bounce back 
until the end of the 1990s, whereby the 
year of the Kosovo crisis (1999) was a 
further setback. Because of their close 
trade relationships with Serbia, Bulgaria 
and Romania also suffered greatly from 
the UN-blockade.
Serbia not only completely failed 
in its attempt to retain dominance over 
large parts of the former Yugoslavia, it 
also lost something which it otherwise 
would not have: Montenegro. It had al-
ways been a staunch ally to Serbia and 
had itself actively participated in 1992 
in the offensives of the federal army and 
Serbia (e.g. at the attack of Croatian Du-
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brovnik) but increasingly distanced itself 
after 1998 and broke completely from its 
confederation with Serbia in 2006. Ser-
bia had probably already lost Kosovo de 
facto through the events of 1990 (strip-
ping the Albanian administration of 
power in the autonomous province). The 
expulsions in 1999 definitely ruled out 
any possibility of a peaceful and demo-
cratic re-integration of Kosovo into the 
Serbian state federation. Serbian politi-
cians of every political stripe still main-
tain Serbia’s claim to Kosovo and the 
illusion of a possible re-integration even 
today; the Serbian Orthodox Church en-
courages this as well.
Serbia’s actions in the early 1990s and 
its attitude up to 2000 weighed on its 
relationship not only with the other suc-
cessor states of Yugoslavia but also with 
the international community as a whole. 
In fact the European Union rushed to the 
aid of Belgrade following Milošević’s 
removal in 2000. With its Stability Pact 
for South East Europe it created an in-
strument for strengthening Serbia’s con-
nection to the rest of Europe. However, 
the nationalistic forces that dominate the 
spectrum of political parties in Serbia, 
the tepid willingness of the country to 
cooperate with the Hague War Crimes 
Tribunal, and its rigid attitude in the Ko-
sovo question have thus far been obsta-
cles to rapprochement. The orientation 
toward Russia, which has in fact always 
supported Belgrade on the Kosovo-ques-
tion, is seen by some political forces as 
a more favorable option, but in the long 
run is not a viable alternative to Euro-
pean integration.
The attempt of the international 
community to stem the conflicts in 
South East Europe (Fig. 2)
In the latter phase of the Bosnia war 
(1995) and the Kosovo-conflict (1999), 
NATO founding member Italy served 
as a military NATO base. NATO bomb-
ers flew combat missions from Italian 
airfields Aviano, Cervia and Gioia del 
Colle against targets in Bosnia-Herce-
govina and Serbia. These combat mis-
sions decided the conflict in both cases. 
Consequently the Bosniaks and Croatian 
groups won the upper hand over the 
Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina and recap-
tured western Bosnia. The military turn 
of the tide in Bosnia was also a condition 
for the successful liberation action in 
Croatia in the Serbian occupied regions 
of Western Slavonia (May 1995) and on 
the borders of Bosnia-Hercegovina (Au-
gust 1995). The NATO aerial bombard-
ment of Belgrade, Novi Sad and other 
Serbian cities forced Milošević to sur-
render in the Kosovo conflict.
The deployment of a relatively small 
UN-force in Macedonia from 1992 to 
1999 probably caused Belgrade to accept 
the independence of Macedonia with-
out military resistance. It may also have 
helped to deter the Kosovar underground 
army UÇK until 2000 from operations in 
Albanian areas in Macedonia.
The NATO-expansion of 1999 to Po-
land, the Czech Republic and Hungary 
supplied the Western military alliance 
direct land access to Serbia for the first 
time and particularly through the mem-
bership of Hungary, another potential 
base of operations. However Hungary 
did not tolerate any direct NATO actions 
in the Kosovo conflict in 1999 from Hun-
garian territory, out of consideration for 
its large ethnic minority in the Serbian 
Vojvodina.
The NATO expansion in 2004 to Slov-
enia, Romania and Bulgaria (as well as 
around Slovakia and the Baltic regions) 
resulted in complete encirclement of the 
Balkan crisis region (Greece and Tur-
key have been members of NATO since 
1952). Since January 1, 2007 this region 
has also been surrounded by the EU-
states. That the relatively less developed 
countries Romania and Bulgaria could 
join the EU so early in the transforma-
tion process, can also be seen as part of 
the containment strategy.
With NATO acceptance of Croatia 
and Albania, which had already been 
members of the NATO Partnership for 
Peace program at the Bucharest sum-
mit (April 2-5, 2008) the circle was once 
again drawn tighter around the conflict 
regions of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Ser-
bia/Kosovo. The only thing preventing 
Macedonia from becoming part of this 
circle was the name controversy with 
Greece.
NATO expansion from 1999 to 2008 
and beyond, which deployed UN, NATO 
and EU troops in Bosnia-Hercegovina, 
in Kosovo and also Macedonia ensured 
the complete containment of  the threat 
of military-led violent conflicts in the 
region, but did not preclude civil vio-
lence and political instability with all 
its (also economic and demographical) 
consequences. It also severely restricted 
the opportunity for other powers (e.g. 
Russia) to actively intervene in the re-
gion.
Fig. 2: NATO membership and crisis regions in South East Europe
Source: own design
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Steps for the integration of South 
East Europe into European struc-
tures
South East Europe represents (with the 
exception of Eastern Europe, meaning 
Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine, which 
as a constituent of a politically integrat-
ed Europe does not appear to come into 
question as yet) the largest region and 
most compact economic periphery of 
Europe. Most economic and social in-
dicators reveal a great distance between 
it and the states of East Central Europe 
(Fig. 3).
This has been rooted in developments 
since the early middle ages, but can be 
explained mainly by the long rule of the 
Ottoman Empire, which hindered inno-
vative processes and the subsequent ex-
istence of antagonistic nation states that 
found cooperation difficult.
The long dominance of the Ottoman 
Empire also caused South East Europe 
to differentiate itself substantially from 
other parts of Europe up until the present 
day (particularly from West, North and 
Central Europe) in its legal systems and 
the attitude of citizens towards the state 
and national institutions. Through cen-
turies broad segments of the population 
have considered the state an occupying 
force, avoided cooperation with it, and 
secured advancement through fostering 
of private networks.
The significant lag in socio-economic 
areas, the differences in legal and politi-
cal culture and not the least national an-
tagonisms, which came to the fore in the 
collapse of Yugoslavia only in the most 
spectacular way, make grafting South 
East Europe onto the rest of Europe and 
its political and economic integration 
particularly difficult.
It is nevertheless undisputed in Eu-
rope that full political and economic in-
tegration into the rest of Europe and the 
EU should also be open to South East 
Europe. And there is no doubt about the 
European identity of this region, which 
generates a feeling of community with 
the region and the readiness for acts of 
solidarity with it. The violent conflicts of 
the 1990s have awakened the awareness 
of the states and citizens of Western Eu-
rope to the European responsibility for 
this region. Finally, it was Europe’s fail-
ures in post-Yugoslav crisis management 
and the sobering experience that such 
violent conflicts could only ultimately 
be ended through American intervention 
that helped to advance political unity in 
Europe itself and helped it to improve to 
a certain degree.
The energetic efforts of the EU how-
ever to introduce the states of South East 
Europe to the EU since early 2000, have 
come up against current obstacles aside 
from those of a more cultural-historical 
character already mentioned: the reluc-
tance of Serbs, and for quite some time 
also the Croatians to cooperate with the 
Hague War Crimes Tribunal; the disunity 
of the nations in Bosnia and Hercegovina 
over the common state and their position 
on it; the conflicts between Albanians 
and ethnic Macedonians in Macedonia; 
the longlasting uncertainties in relations 
between Serbia and Montenegro, and 
Serbia and Kosovo; Serbia’s continued 
attitude of defiance toward the independ-
ence of Kosovo; the internal political 
situation in Serbia; the Western patterns 
often less appropriate democratic po-
litical practice also in Albania, Bulgaria 
and Romania.
Its lack for the most part of such inte-
gration barriers, also its slight complex-
ity with respect to the post-Yugoslavian 
problem situation, along with its role as 
a pioneering in the economic transfor-
mation process, gave Slovenia – actually 
Central European and Mediterranean, not 
in a cultural-spatial sense South East Eu-
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Fig. 3: Gross domestic product according to purchasing power per capita in 2004 in Central 
and South East Europe
Source: Wiener institut für internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche (ed.) (2007)
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ropean – an integration head start which 
led to EU accession on May 1, 2004 (see 
Fig. 4). Already, Slovenia is part of the 
Schengen and the Euro zones. The states 
of Romania and Bulgaria, not directly in-
volved in the post Yugoslavian conflicts 
but important as a safety cordon around 
the conflict areas, achieved EU member-
ship on January 1, 2007. However, they 
are not included in the Schengen area 
and the currency union.
The EU has coined the term “West 
Balkans” to describe the rest of states 
in South East Europe. This describes 
the successor states to Yugoslavia with 
the exception of Slovenia, and Albania. 
Croatia, though not a part of South East 
Europe in a cultural spatial sense and 
also not carrying the historical baggage 
that the other states do, must nonetheless 
arrange itself in these terms.
In 1999, following the Kosovo conflict 
accompanied by the removal of Milošević 
in Belgrade, the EU designed the Stabil-
ity Pact for South Eastern Europe espe-
cially for these regions, which demanded 
economic and also democratic, political 
and legal development measures that are 
intended to lead to more cooperation be-
tween the affected states.
The individual states of the West 
Balkans have been offered completely 
different integration schedules. The 
EU signed Stabilizing and Association 
Agreements (SAA) with Macedonia 
(4/1/2004), Croatia (2/1/2005), Albania 
(6/12/2006), Montenegro (3/15/2007), 
and Serbia (4/29/2008). Negotiations be-
gan with Bosnia and Hercegovina for a 
SAA on 11/25/2005; its conclusion was 
expected by 6/16/2008. In 2005, the EU 
granted Croatia and Macedonia the status 
of a candidate country. However, while 
negotiations are underway with Croatia 
and have progressed relatively far, they 
have not even begun with Macedonia. In 
both cases an accession date has not yet 
been determined. The EU provides the 
function of protection and monitoring in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina and, since its “con-
trolled sovereignty”, also in Kosovo and 
has an administrative military presence. 
In fact, both states are protectorates of 
the European Union.
All of the West Balkan states are ac-
cession candidates according to the ex-
pressed will of the EU (European Com-
mission 2008). The actual time of an EU 
accession will depend in all cases not only 
on the progress of respective reforms and 
adaptations, but also on the readiness of 
the EU to accept them. This readiness 
has dropped considerably since the ac-
cession waves of 2004 and 2007 and 
their subsequent difficulties. This could 
also affect Croatia, but its admission into 
the EU should be easy to cope with, due 
to its extensively transformed economy, 
its considerable economic achievements 
(it lies considerably over that of the EU 
members Bulgaria and Romania), and its 
small size among other conditions. 
Serbia and Bosnia-Hercegovina offer 
the greatest difficulty: Serbia, particu-
larly for its domestic instability and its 
wavering foreign political orientation 
between a European and Russian option; 
Bosnia-Hercegovina because it is far 
from stable as a state and is still bicker-
ing over the goals of its three constituent 
nations.
Acute and dormant conflict  
regions
Kosovo
Rationally considered, the independ-
ence of Kosovo in the beginning of 2008 
means the end of a considerable burden 
for Serbia. It is rid of the worry of a na-
tional minority that both demographi-
cally grows disproportionately, and is 
politically less acquiescent; also of an 
economically weak region which was 
a sink for development aid even during 
the time of communist Yugoslavia and 
which it would have had to support with 
its own means. With the generous ges-
ture of letting go of Kosovo to obtain its 
independence, Serbia could also have 
gained a positive footing in relation to 
the new state, the goodwill of the inter-
national community and great attractive-
ness for investors.
The political class of Serbia was ap-
parently not in the position to make such 
a gesture, because it (like with few ex-
ceptions the elite of  Serbs as a whole, 
particularly also the Serbian Orthodox 
Church) is imprisoned in the history 
burdened Serbian nationalism, which ac-
cords Kosovo a key position as the “Cra-
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Fig. 4: Status of the European Union Integration 2008 in South East Europe
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dle of the Serbian Nation”. A change in 
this position is not likely in the near fu-
ture.
That means prolonged strained rela-
tionships between Serbs and Albanians 
in the whole region, particularly between 
the roughly 100,000 Serbs4 remaining in 
Kosovo and the present state nation of 
the Albanian Kosovars as well as in the 
approximate border area between Ser-
bia and Kosovo. Under these conditions 
it will also be extremely difficult to in-
tegrate the Serbian majority communes 
of Kosovska Mitrovica/Mitrivice and 
Leposavić/Leposaviq from the north of 
Kosovo into the new state and it is possi-
ble that the Albanian majority communes 
of Medveđa, Bujanovac and Preševo in 
southern Serbia may wish to separate 
themselves from their hostile surround-
ings and join Kosovo. That could lead to 
new crises.
Continuing strained relations with its 
large neighbor Serbia and between the 
two national groups in Kosovo will also 
mean that Kosovo itself will be seriously 
impaired economically because the po-
tential economic relations between the 
two countries cannot be exploited and 
Kosovo will continue to be an insecure 
ground for investors. That could cause 
the small state, even with exemplary sup-
port from the EU, to remain an economi-
cally weak zone in the long run with a 
high potential for social conflict and a 
strong tendency toward emigration.
That it would join Albania in the 
framework of a “Greater Albania” is not 
likely even under such conditions, since 
the Albanians in Kosovo and in Macedo-
nia on one hand, and Albania on the oth-
er, “grew apart” during the communist 
period. The Albanians in Kosovo and 
Macedonia were socialized in the rela-
tively liberal and prosperous Yugoslavia 
and look down on the Albanians in the 
mother country who grew up under a 
rigid and poor communist dictatorship.
The international community and 
particularly the EU can probably counter 
this development best by continuing in-
tensive talks with Serbia, offer it concrete 
support and perspectives for EU acces-
sion.  This is the only way a new political 
elite can develop in Serbia, which places 
less importance on nationalist feelings 
and may also be able to redefine Serbian 
national ideas.
4  According to estimates by UNHCR (www.unhcr.ch) , 
KFOR (www.nato.int/kfor), and OSCE
Macedonia
The Ohrid Agreement, which was con-
cluded under the aegis of the international 
community in August 2001 and with its 
pressure has since then been implemented 
to a great extent  granted the large Albani-
an minority in Macedonia (census 2002: 
25.2 %)5 the status of a second state nation 
and fulfils many of their demands in the 
area of democratic co-determination, ed-
ucation and public administration. Never-
theless, the desires of some Albanians go 
well beyond the provisions of the Ohrid 
Agreement, whereby the demand to fed-
eralize the state, plays an important role. 
Conversely, many ethnic Macedonians 
found even the obligations of the Agree-
ment as imposition.
In addition, the relationship between 
the two groups is strained by the sub-
stantially larger demographic dynamics 
of Albanians, which the ethnic Macedo-
nians refer to as an “inner invasion”. Fur-
thermore, the Orthodox ethnic Macedo-
nians believe that the Muslim Albanians, 
Turks, Roma and Torbeši groups, which 
make up 32.5 % (2002) of the population, 
form a “Muslim phalanx”.
It is undeniable, however, that despite 
a certain political warming between 
Macedonians and Albanians since 2001, 
both groups still exist as parallel socie-
ties in daily life and hardly come into 
contact with one another (see also sironi 
2005; Kahl, maKsuTi & ramaJ 2006). 
This not only concerns language and 
religion, but is based on the reversal of 
the ruling conditions in the Macedonian 
region which took place twice: (1) in a 
country previously dominated by Chris-
tian Slavs, the Albanians that converted 
to Islam under the rule of the Ottoman 
Empire were accorded a portion of state 
power; (2) after the withdrawal of the 
Ottoman Empire (1912/1913) they were 
reduced to a discriminated minority in a 
Slavic state (Serbia). Ethnic Macedonians 
still perpetuate the image of the apostate 
Albanian and look down on them with a 
certain feeling of superiority.
It is still not likely that the Albanian 
Macedonians will blast the state with 
unreasonable demands or that they will 
align themselves with one of both of the 
Albanian neighbouring states (Albania, 
Kosovo), as long as their economic situa-
tion in Macedonia is much better than in 
Albania or in Kosovo. The desire for af-
filiation to Albania is also improbable for 
5 statistical office of republic of Macedonia
the reasons mentioned already for Kos-
ovo. There are, however, close relations 
with the Kosovar Albanians from the 
time of Tito’s Yugoslavia, and particu-
larly from the 1990s when Albanians set 
up Kosovo as a shadow state, Albanian 
elites retreated from Kosovo to Macedo-
nia, and thereby cooperated closely with 
the Macedonian Albanians. Progress in 
the development of Kosovo could also 
awaken the desire among the Macedo-
nian Albanians to join it. A collapse of 
Macedonia would have consequences 
that are difficult to predict for the rest of 
the region.
Bosnia-Hercegovina
The Dayton Accord, which came about 
under the American and European ae-
gis in December 1995, did not remove 
or erase the ethnic segregation caused 
by war, “ethnic cleansing”, and refugees 
in the once ethnically mixed Bosnia-
Hercegovina, but instead consolidated it. 
In separating the state along to national-
ist lines into Serbian and Bosniak-Croat 
constituent states (called “entities”) and 
furthermore by deliniating 10 cantons 
in the Bosniak-Croat constituent state 
(Fig. 5) according to national criteria, it 
divided the whole state in a completely 
nationalist fashion. What was evidently 
unavoidable in order to achieve a truce, 
has proven as the basis for the function-
ing of the state to be a heavy burden.
Since the strongest competencies rest 
with the constituent states and (in the 
Bosniak-Croat constituent state) cantons, 
and the whole state can only act, when all 
three constituent nations (Bosniaks, Serbs, 
Croats) agree, it is no wonder that Bosnia-
Hercegovina has not become cohesive – 
neither politically nor economically.
Aside from the international commu-
nity, which has served as protector and 
monitor since 1995, only the Bosniak 
majority population (2004/05): 50 %)6 is 
interested in keeping the state whole.
The Serbian constituent republic 
gives the impression of being relatively 
content with its present condition as a de 
facto independent state under the mantle 
of the powerless Bosnian-Hercegovian 
total state. The Bosnian-Serbian elites 
have set themselves up in this constitu-
ent state and could not expect any bet-
6 Personal calculation according to estimated dates of 
the federalni zavod za statistiku (2004) for the Federation 
of Bosnia-Hercegovina and according to the estimation 
of the Slovenian demographer Josipovič (2005) for the 
Serbian Republic.
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ter position from an affiliation with the 
mother country Serbia. Certain features 
of Bosnian-Serbian identity like the use 
of the Serbian language in its ijekavian 
variant (in contrast to the Serbian-used 
ekavian variant) may support this self-
sufficiency. Its future attitude will cer-
tainly depend on the situation in Serbia.
The Croatians of Bosnia and Herze-
govina make up the majority in three of the 
cantons of the Federation but are neither 
the majority in the state as a whole, nor in 
any one of the entities. Despite their formal 
equal status as one of the three constitutive 
nation states, they find themselves de facto 
in a double minority position. They partici-
pate in political, cultural and economic life 
in Bosnia-Hercegovina only in a restrict-
ed way and orient themselves mainly  to 
Croatia (sKočiBušić 2005).
Under these complicated circum-
stances, the economic development of the 
country has suffered. Many young and 
educated people are still emigrating. The 
international community is still holding 
strong to the total state. But it must re-
main weak under the Dayton framework 
despite some progress (establishment of 
a common police force) and is powerless 
to oppose the diverging interests of the 
three nations.
Once the neighboring states are politi-
cally stable and securely embedded in the 
European structures, there will have to 
be a political realignment of the present 
region of Bosnia and Hercegovina which 
could be connected to crises.
Conclusion and future prospects: 
Current and possible roles of 
South East Europe in Europe 
(with special consideration to its 
Mediterranean components)
South East Europe will be able to quit its 
present role as Europe’s periphery and a 
crisis region, close its gap between the 
European standard of living, and gain 
its own clout as a region in Europe once 
its states stop thinking only of their own 
respective development, and instead 
overcome their own contradictory na-
tionalisms and begin to work together on 
neighborly, intra-regional cooperation. 
In a small mosaic of small states like 
that of South East Europe there has to 
be a special type of acceptance of one’s 
neighbors and cooperation with them.
The shortcoming of this respect is also 
evident in foreign trade, which is marginal 
between the states of South East Europe. 
But several sub-regions do have closer 
ties: especially Slovenia, Croatia and 
Bosnia-Hercegovina; Serbia is economi-
cally strongly connected to Montenegro, 
Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina 
(Wiener insTiTuT für inTernaTionale 
WirTschafTsvergleiche 2007). Far more 
intensive external trading integration ex-
ists between the whole of South East Eu-
rope and Italy, to which most exports from 
many countries go (Bulgaria, Romania, 
Croatia, Albania). Far behind Italy, but 
still prominent trading partners, are the 
Mediterranean countries Greece and Tur-
key. However, in terms of foreign invest-
ment, Italy is far behind Central and West 
European countries and is scarcely more 
strongly represented in South East Europe 
than Greece or Cyprus (Wiener insTiTuT 
für inTernaTionale WirTschafTsver-
gleiche 2006).
Overall, the current economic inte-
gration of South East Europe with the 
Mediterranean is strong. This is under-
scored by active legal and illegal worker 
migration from South East Europe espe-
cially to Italy, but also to Spain, Portugal, 
Greece and Turkey. If one considers for-
eign trade, foreign investments and work 
migration in the same way, South East 
Europe is oriented in about the same de-
gree (admittedly different according to 
country) to both Central Europe and the 
Mediterranean.
 By its very nature, South East Europe 
is in the role of a bridgehead to South-
west Asia and the Middle East (see also 
zeune 1833, vol. 2, p. 242). Historically 
it fulfilled this role, particularly when it 
was part of the territory of great empires 
that stretched over both continents. This 
was the case in the Eastern Roman, the 
Byzantine and the Ottoman empires. 
The central regions of these three em-
pires connecting South East Europe with 
Southwest Asia, lay also partly in South 
East Europe.
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Fig. 5: Administrative division of Bosnia and Hercegovina
Source: Jordan, p. &  k. kocsis et al. 2007
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However, while Eastern Rome and By-
zantium, centered in the Bosporous, until 
the 12th century extended culturally and 
politically in both directions, radiated in 
the far corners of Europe, influenced Eu-
ropean culture considerably, and in turn 
received impulse from the rest of Eu-
rope, this function was to a great extent 
lost in the later Byzantine Empire. The 
Ottoman Empire established itself in Eu-
rope from the beginning as a culturally 
and politically antagonistic power. South 
East Europe moved from a bridgehead of 
exchange in both directions to a South-
west Asian occupation in Europe – a 
“Turkish” or “Turkish-Greek” peninsula 
(daniel 1875, S. 26) in Europe, which 
scarcely maintained ties with the rest of 
Europe.
The retreat of the Ottoman Empire 
from the greater part of South East Eu-
rope (with exception of eastern Thrace, 
the “European Turkey”) and the creation 
of the Turkish state stripped it of this 
function as well. The nation states in the 
territory of the former Ottoman Empire 
were mostly hostile to Turkey, the home-
land of the former occupier. This attitude 
intensified during the communist era, 
since South East Europe and Turkey be-
longed to different political systems and 
military blocs. The bridgehead function 
of South East Europe reduced itself to 
a minimum of economic relations and 
transit traffic in this time.
Following the political changes in 
Eastern Europe, it was revived compre-
hensively. This was not only due to eco-
nomic and transportation relationships, 
but also as a consequence of the very 
active role that Turkey played politically, 
economically and culturally, particular-
ly in the Black Sea region and in other 
parts of South East Europe; it was also a 
consequence of the Turkey’s application 
to become a member of the EU (acces-
sion attempt 1987, accession candidate 
since 1999, accession negotiations since 
2005).
For Turkey and other states with Mus-
lim majorities, the Muslim groups of 
South East Europe are a special pivot. 
Altogether about 7,650,000 Muslims 
lived in the former communist South 
East Europe (without Turkey, Greece and 
Cyprus) at the beginning of the 2000s; 
a figure arrived at partly with census 
data, and partly according to estimation 
(Jordan & Kocsis et al. 2007). Among 
the Muslim groups of South East Europe 
are the Muslim Albanians in Albania ac-
cording to numbers, the largest (about 
2.1 million), followed by Bosniaks in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina (1.688 million), the 
Muslim Albanians in Serbia, Kosovo 
and Montenegro (about 1.5 million), the 
Turks in Bulgaria (747,000), the Muslim 
Albanians in Macedonia (509,000), the 
Roma in Bulgaria (371,000), the Bos-
niaks, “Muslims” and Gorans in Serbia, 
Kosovo and Montenegro (about 280,000) 
and the Pomakhs in Bulgaria (about 
250,000). All other groups have less than 
78,000 members.
All Muslims in South East Europe 
have been settled since the 16th century 
at the latest and are an inheritance of the 
Ottoman Empire, which was a Muslim 
state, under whose dominance previous 
Christian autochthonic groups (Albani-
ans, Slavic Bosniaks, Pomakhs, Torbeši 
and Gorans) converted to Islam and to 
a lesser degree to which Muslim groups 
also immigrated (Turks, Tatars, also 
Roma).
However, the close connection be-
tween religion and state, which is char-
acteristic for the Muslim states and 
which uses Islam in order to assert its 
religious rule with help of the state was 
lost in South East Europe with the retreat 
of the Ottoman realm. The upshot was a 
secularization of Muslim groups. Today 
religion hardly figures in the daily life of 
the Muslims – in some cases, even less 
so than it does for Christians. This secu-
larized “European” Islam differentiates 
itself clearly from that of the recent im-
migration groups from Turkey or other 
countries in the cities of western Europe. 
In the streets of Sarajevo one sees fewer 
women with a head scarf than in many 
parts of Berlin or Vienna.
It is true that many Muslim groups in 
South East Europe like Bosnians or Po-
makhs draw their specific identity from 
religion, but religion forms only the cul-
tural background of their identity. It is in 
no case practiced by all members of the 
group. In no case does it imply a Muslim 
culture in the sense of value or code of 
conduct shaped by Islam in its substan-
tial elements. For Albanians, Islam does 
even not have the character of a feature 
of national identity since many Albani-
ans are also Orthodox or Catholics – so 
religion for Albanians is not binding but 
separating.
The Muslim groups of South East 
Europe maintain nevertheless special 
relationships to Muslim countries and 
receive support from them. They are 
however less receptive to fundamen-
talist influences. Thus, fundamentalist 
movements have not been able to gain a 
foothold in the long run, even during the 
the Bosnian War, when the Muslim Bos-
niaks were dependent on financial help 
and arms supplies from Islamic coun-
tries – the best conditions for exercising 
influence.
Muslim groups are especially aware 
of the geopolitical bridgehead function 
of South East Europe to Southwest Asia 
in both directions and are currently sub-
stantially strengthening it.
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